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ABSTRACT: In this commentary I build on Phil Barnard’s distinction of implicational 
and propositional meanings as an incentive to explore possibilities for bridging the 
two types of meanings. I argue that, contrary to the claim that musical experiences are 
ineffable, the subtle implicational meanings that make up the experiential richness of 
musical qualia may be amenable to linguistic description and objectification, provided 
that a suitable language is being used. Taking music-evoked emotional experiences as 
an example, I sketch the contours of such a language and also discuss criteria by 
which the suitability of a language to characterize musical qualia may be evaluated.  
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THE notion of music’s effects and meanings as ineffable, since they cannot be communicated, or 
apprehended by any means other than by direct experience, has a venerable tradition (e.g., 
Jankélévitch, 2003). This issue is once again brought to the fore by Phil Barnard’s article, in which he 
makes a distinction between implicational and propositional meaning: 
The analysis considers two qualitatively different types of meaning originally 
proposed by Barnard and Teasdale (1991) to analyse relationships between 
cognition, affect and embodiment. One form of meaning relates to the encoding of 
“propositions,” whilst the other blends ideas, externally derived percepts and bodily 
experience to form “implicational meanings.” These are more abstract schemata or 
models of deep multimodal interdependences that equate more with latent senses of 
meaning or knowing as well as feelings, intuitions and affect. Propositional and 
implicational meanings co-exist in mental architecture and depend one upon the 
other. While language skills are more clearly focused on the form and expression of 
propositional meanings, musical expertise and aesthetic appreciation links most 
readily to implicational meanings. 
Barnard further notes that “forms like poetry, metaphor and parable more accurately capture the rich 
yet latent high dimensionality of implicational meanings.” For the sake of brevity, I will not scrutinize 
this distinction any further. Rather, I shall take it as a point of departure for discussing a question, long 
known in the philosophy of consciousness, namely, whether experiences of implicational meaning can 
be, if not comprehended entirely, at least indexed by means of some form of language.  
The implication of this distinction is not that music scholars would generally engage in a 
pointless initiative, due to the absence of a system for translating implicational meaning into 
propositional meaning. Indeed, it is possible to analyze the characteristics of various musical systems, 
describe how people relate to music across different contexts and cultures, describe music education 
programs at different levels, or report findings on brain correlates of musical processing and so on. 
Such works speak of music, and do so in meaningful ways. Thus, the notion of ineffability does not 
relate to any form of proposition about music. What seems to elude a transcription into propositional 
terms is the inner experience of music, the “what-it-is-like-to-experience-music.” It is the apparent 
impossibility to characterize the experience of music that has earned this experience the reputation of 
being unspeakable. In what may seem a strange opening to a book, Daniel Barenboim notes: “I firmly 
believe that it is impossible to speak about music” (Barenboim, 2008, p. 5).  
Because there is a relatively broad consensus that musical experiences are often of an emotive 
kind (Juslin & Sloboda, 2010), it is worthwhile to briefly examine how research on emotion has dealt 
with the problem of objectifying a subjective inner experience. Mindful of the difficulties in capturing 
the rich implicational meanings of the experience of emotion, emotion psychologists have prioritized 
the analysis and description of expressions of emotion, in particular those overt ones that can be 
measured. These measurable or quantifiable “exteriorizations” include the physiological correlates of 
emotion, the expression of emotion in face and voice, the action tendencies associated with emotions, 
and the verbal reports of emotional feelings.  
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The copious literature describing these relationships carries two important messages. First, 
although the inner experience of an emotion is a private and subjective one, its expressions are 
amenable to scientific description, quantification, and analysis. This has led emotion psychologists to 
look at the similarity or dissimilarity of individuals’ emotive reactions to specific situations based on 
how their emotions are expressed. For example, the reaction to an emotion trigger, say, the sudden 
sight of a snake, is systematically followed by indicators of physiological arousal (e.g., amygdala 
activation in the brain, heart rate acceleration), action tendencies (startle, followed by turning away and 
flight), and facial expressions characteristic of fear that are similar across people. Thus, although we 
cannot know what people’s inner experience to the sight of a snake might feel like, the assumption is 
that the similarity in emotion expression is subtended by an interpersonally similar inner experience of 
the emotion. In other words, the similarity and dissimilarity of inner subjective experiences across 
individuals, while not directly accessible, can nonetheless be inferred.  
This would seem to suggest that the notion that because experiences are subjective and 
private, all interpersonal comparisons of inner experiences are systematically impossible (e.g., Dennett, 
1991) is exaggerated. Indeed, why should we not be able to gauge the extent of similarity in listeners’ 
inner experiences to a piece of music by relying on the similarity with which these experiences are 
being expressed? What seems impossible is only a direct characterization of the inner experience, what 
is referred to as “quale” in the philosophy of consciousness. Qualia, the plural of quale, is a term used 
to refer to subjective conscious experiences as “raw feels” (Ferber, 2003). A frequently cited 
description of the nature of qualia is a thought experiment by Jackson (1982), which runs as follows:  
Mary the colour scientist knows all the physical facts about colour, including every 
physical fact about the experience of colour in other people, from the behavior that 
the particular colour is likely to elicit to the specific sequence of neurological firings 
that register that a colour has been seen. However, she has been confined from birth 
to a room that is black and white, and is only allowed to observe the outside world 
through a black and white monitor. When she is allowed to leave the room, it must be 
admitted that she learns something about the colour red the first time she sees it — 
specifically, she learns what it is like to see that colour. 
Many responses and criticisms have been offered in response to this thought experiment (e.g., Tye, 
2009; Wright, 2008). Our question here is whether there is a form of knowledge that might have made 
Mary’s experience of red, when she finally sees it, less novel or surprising than it might have otherwise 
been. Since qualia seem easier to communicate through poetry, metaphor, analogy, and parable (Lakoff 
& Johnson, 1999), we ought to ask how much “metaphoric knowledge” of red Mary had. We may 
contend that, by having read extensively about poetic and metaphoric characterizations of red, Mary 
might still have learned something new about the color red when seeing it, but she might have been less 
surprised or intrigued by the experience.  
This scenario raises the possibility of a language at the interface of science and poetry that 
may serve as a better approximation to qualia than is offered by declarative or propositional statements 
and yet be amenable to formalization and quantification. Such a language does not currently exist, 
either generically or for the special case of musical qualia. Perhaps contrary to expectation, it is not the 
development of such a language that presents the greatest challenge. The real difficulty is to set up 
criteria against which the merits or advantages of a vocabulary or language over other possible 
vocabularies or languages can be systematically evaluated. Because this may sound somewhat abstract, 
I will briefly describe research conducted in our laboratory that illustrates this point. In our work on the 
characterization and classification of music-induced emotion, we first devised a vocabulary to describe 
the emotive characteristics of musical experiences. The method for creating this vocabulary is 
described elsewhere, but essentially we started out with 515 affect terms that were progressively 
narrowed down to those that repeated experiments had shown to be most useful in describing music-
induced emotion. This resulted in the Geneva Emotional Music Scale, also called GEMS (Zentner, 
Grandjean, & Scherer, 2008; Zentner, 2010). The GEMS vocabulary, though not a metaphoric 
vocabulary proper, consists nevertheless of terms that would be more typically used by novelists than 
by experimental psychologists or philosophers, including such terms as ardent (fiery), bouleversé 
(overwhelmed), emerveillé (filled with wonder), ému (moved), héroïque (heroic), rêveur (dreamy), 
sautillant (bouncy), and sentiment de transcendance (feeling of transcendence). 
Once developed, we tested the merits of the GEMS against alternative emotion vocabularies 
that had been used previously to describe the emotive properties of musical experiences. The 
incremental validity of the GEMS vocabulary over alternative descriptive schemes was evaluated on 
the basis of three criteria: (a) phenomenological plausibility; (b) sensitivity in capturing interpersonal 
similarity in emotive experience, and (c) power of discriminating musical excerpts based on affect 
ratings. The first criterion is met when listeners more frequently choose to describe their affective 
reactions to music with terms provided by our vocabulary than with terms derived from alternative 
vocabularies. Second, only a vocabulary suited to capture the emotive features of musical qualia can 
identify interpersonal similarity in musical experience, when it exists. A deficient vocabulary more 
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likely leads to arbitrary responses and thus an absence of agreement. Consider a situation in which 
people have four choices to describe a Prussian blue: black, grey, brown, and purple. Because these are 
about equally imperfect descriptors of the color blue, individuals would likely differ in their choices, 
leading to a heterogeneous response pattern. If, however, the selections were navy, black, brown, and 
purple, most individuals would probably converge on navy as the closest approximation to the Prussian 
blue. In other words, the higher the coefficients of intersubjective agreement (that can be indexed with 
coefficients such as Cronbach’s α, McDonald’s ω or the intraclass coefficient, depending on the nature 
of the data), the more likely it is that the language has been capturing some essential features the 
musical qualia.  
The last criterion relates to a form of reverse engineering. We asked how well various musical 
excerpts could be differentiated and classified from the GEMS compared to the classification obtained 
from alternative descriptive vocabularies for emotion. An apt vocabulary for describing musical qualia 
should be able to “return” the stylistic, rhythmic, melodic, timbric, and harmonic aspects of musical 
pieces in a more nuanced way than an inept vocabulary. Thus, while the latter may manage to group 
musical works into two categories such as slow and fast ones, the former might be able to return the 
distinction between pieces from the classical vs romantic period, or between hip-hop vs hard rock 
songs.  Methods such as cluster analysis can be used to examine the granularity and accuracy of such 
groupings. There is also a nonlinguistic alternative to probe the third criterion. Individuals can make 
similarity judgments of musical experiences without using any verbal labels. In such experiments, 
participants can be required to listen to various pieces and to group together those that evoked similar 
(emotional) experiences. Multidimensional scaling techniques can be used to examine whether the 
nonverbal groupings converge with the classification obtained from verbal reports. The eventual 
presence of such convergence would denote “cross-validation,” that is, the confirmation of a finding by 
at least two independent assay techniques. As is described in our publications (Trost, Ethofer, Zentner, 
& Vuilleumier, 2012; Zentner et al., 2008; Zentner, 2010), our vocabulary fulfilled these three criteria 
to some extent, thereby increasing our confidence in having identified a language that has the potential 
to characterize and classify emotive properties of music-evoked qualia.  
To recapitulate, I have used (or, rather, misused) Phil Barnard’s distinction of implicational 
and propositional meanings as an incentive to explore possibilities for bridging the two types of 
meanings. I have argued that, rather than being hopelessly ineffable, the subtle implicational meanings 
that make up the experiential richness of musical qualia may be amenable to linguistic description, 
albeit of a special kind that warrants further study and development.  
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